50 years trend control
50 years repackaged global crime
Since the 1958 Dutch natural gas discovery: seized development by Exxon in the 1963 Monster Deal.
See 'Royal Dutch Disease' and 'La condition Americaine'.
FOREIGN POLICY, OIL & GLOBAL INSTABILITY
Esso industrial trend control and abuse
Whereas in Global Trends 2015 we viewed globalization�growing interconnectedness reflected in the expanded flows of information, technology, capital, goods, services, and people throughout the world�as among an array of key drivers, we now view it more as a �mega-trend��a force so ubiquitous that it will substantially shape all of the other major trends in the world of 2020.
The reach of globalization was substantially broadened during the last 20 years by Chinese and Indian economic liberalization, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the worldwide information technology revolution. Through the next 15 years, it will sustain world economic growth, raise world living standards, and substantially deepen global interdependence. At the same time, it will profoundly shake up the status quo almost everywhere�generating enormous economic, cultural, and consequently political convulsions.
Certain aspects of globalization, such as the growing global inter-connectedness stemming from the information technology revolution, are likely to be irreversible. Real-time communication, which has transformed politics almost everywhere, is a phenomenon that even repressive governments would find difficult to expunge.
Yet the process of globalization, powerful as it is, could be substantially slowed or even reversed, just as the era of globalization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was reversed by catastrophic war and global depression. Some features that we associate with the globalization of the 1990s�such as economic and political liberalization�are prone to �fits and starts� and probably will depend on progress in multilateral negotiations, improvements in national governance, and the reduction of conflicts. The freer flow of people across national borders will continue to face social and political obstacles even when there is a pressing need for migrant workers.
Rising Asia will continue to reshape globalization, giving it less of a �Made in the USA� character and more of an Asian look and feel. At the same time, Asia will alter the rules of the globalizing process. By having the fastest-growing consumer markets, more firms becoming world-class multinationals, and greater S&T stature, Asia looks set to displace Western countries as the focus for international economic dynamism�provided Asia�s rapid economic growth continues.
Asian finance ministers have considered establishing an Asian monetary fund that would operate along different lines from IMF, attaching fewer strings on currency swaps and giving Asian decision-makers more leeway from the �Washington macro-economic consensus.�
As governments devote more resources to basic research and development, rising Asia will continue to attract applied technology from around the world, including cutting-edge technology, which should boost their high performance sectors. We already anticipate (as stated in the text) that the Asian giants may use the power of their markets to set industry standards, rather than adopting those promoted by Western nations or international standards bodies. The international intellectual property rights regime will be profoundly molded by IPR regulatory and law enforcement practices in East and South Asia.
Increased labor force participation in the global economy, especially by China, India, and Indonesia, will have enormous effects, possibly spurring internal and regional migrations. Either way it will have a large impact, determining the relative size of the world�s greatest new �mega-cities� and, perhaps, act as a key variable for political stability/instability for decades to come. To the degree that these vast internal migrations spill over national borders�currently, only a miniscule fraction of China�s 100 million internal migrants end up abroad�they could have major repercussions for other regions, including Europe and North America.
An expanded Asian-centric cultural identity may be the most profound effect of a rising Asia. Asians have already begun to reduce the percentage of students who travel to Europe and North America with Japan and�most striking�China becoming educational magnets. A new, more Asian cultural identity is likely to be rapidly packaged and distributed as incomes rise and communications networks spread. Korean pop singers are already the rage in Japan, Japanese anime have many fans in China, and Chinese kung-fu movies and Bollywood song-and-dance epics are viewed throughout Asia. Even Hollywood has begun to reflect these Asian influences�an effect that is likely to accelerate through 2020.
Moreover, the character of globalization probably will change just as capitalism changed over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. While today�s most advanced nations�especially the United States�will remain important forces driving capital, technology and goods, globalization is likely to take on much more of a �non-Western face� over the next 15 years.
Currently, about two-thirds of the world�s population live in countries that are connected to the global economy. Even by 2020, however, the benefits of globalization won�t be global. Over the next 15 years, gaps will widen between those countries benefiting from globalization�economically, technologically, and socially�and those underdeveloped nations or pockets within nations that are left behind. Indeed, we see the next 15 years as a period in which the perceptions of the contradictions and uncertainties of a globalized world come even more to the fore than is the case today.
An Expanding and Integrating Global Economy
The process of globalization, powerful as it is, could be substantially slowed or even stopped. Short of a major global conflict, which we regard as improbable, another large-scale development that we believe could stop globalization would be a pandemic. However, other catastrophic developments, such as terrorist attacks, could slow its speed.
Some experts believe it is only a matter of time before a new pandemic appears, such as the 1918�1919 influenza virus that killed an estimated 20 million worldwide. Such a pandemic in megacities of the developing world with poor health-care systems�in Sub-Saharan Africa, China, India, Bangladesh or Pakistan�would be devastating and could spread rapidly throughout the world. Globalization would be endangered if the death toll rose into the millions in several major countries and the spread of the disease put a halt to global travel and trade during an extended period, prompting governments to expend enormous resources on overwhelmed health sectors. On the positive side of the ledger, the response to SARS showed that international surveillance and control mechanisms are becoming more adept at containing diseases, and new developments in biotechnologies hold the promise of continued improvement.
A slow-down could result from a pervasive sense of economic and physical insecurity that led governments to put controls on the flow of capital, goods, people, and technology that stalled economic growth. Such a situation could come about in response to terrorist attacks killing tens or even hundreds of thousands in several US cities or in Europe or to widespread cyber attacks on information technology. Border controls and restrictions on technology exchanges would increase economic transaction costs and hinder innovation and economic growth. Other developments that could stimulate similar restrictive policies include a popular backlash against globalization prompted, perhaps, by white collar rejection of outsourcing in the wealthy countries and/or resistance in poor countries whose peoples saw themselves as victims of globalization.
Most forecasts to 2020 and beyond continue to show higher annual growth for developing countries than for high-income ones. Countries such as China and India will be in a position to achieve higher economic growth than Europe and Japan, whose aging work forces may inhibit their growth. Given its enormous population�and assuming a reasonable degree of real currency appreciation�the dollar value of China�s gross national product (GNP) may be the second largest in the world by 2020. For similar reasons, the value of India�s output could match that of a large European country. The economies of other developing countries, such as Brazil and Indonesia, could surpass all but the largest European economies by 2020. 
Continued Economic Turbulence. Sustained high-growth rates have historical precedents. China already has had about two decades of 7 percent and higher growth rates, and Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have managed in the past to achieve annual rates averaging around 10 percent for a long period.
Fast-developing countries have historically suffered sudden setbacks, however, and economic turbulence is increasingly likely to spill over and upset broader international relations. Many emerging markets�such as Mexico in the mid-1990s and Asian countries in the late 1990s�suffered negative effects from the abrupt reversals of capital movements, and China and India may encounter similar problems. The scale of the potential reversals would be unprecedented, and it is unclear whether current international financial mechanisms would be in a position to forestall wider economic disruption.
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